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Abstract
Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her
preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Instead,
preferences are usually assumed to be xed and exogenously given. We introduce a
framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our
model, an agents preferences are based on certain motivationally salientproperties
of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change as
new properties of the alternatives become salient or previously salient ones cease
to be so. We suggest that our approach captures endogenous preferences in various
contexts, and helps to illuminate the distinction between formal and substantive
concepts of rationality, as well as the role of perception in rational choice.
Keywords: preference formation, preference change, properties, motivations, rea-
sons, endogenous preferences, formal versus substantive rationality, perception
1 Introduction
Rational choice theory o¤ers a powerful framework for analyzing how agents can ratio-
nally make decisions in various situations, whether alone or in interaction with others,
whether under uncertainty or under complete information, whether on the basis of self-
interest or on the basis of other-regarding motivations, and so on. Its key idea goes
back at least to David Humes account of rational agency from the 18th century (e.g.,
Hume 1739): an agent has beliefs and preferences, now usually modelled as subjective
probabilities and utilities, and acts so as to satisfy his or her preferences in accordance
with his or her beliefs. This model of rational agency serves as the foundation of much
of economic theory and the social sciences, ranging from decision theory, game theory
and social choice theory on the theoretical side to the theories of consumer choice and
the rm, general equilibrium theory, spatial voting theory and even the realist the-
ory of international relations on the more applied side. Like any inuential paradigm,
rational choice theory has come under criticism from several angles both theoretical
and empirical and may ultimately need to be revised or generalized, but for now it
remains an indispensable part of any economists toolbox.
However, while rational choice theory is able to show with great precision how an
agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, one of the standard theorys
We are grateful for helpful discussions with David Austen-Smith, Richard Bradley, John Broome,
Tim Feddersen, Philip Pettit, Wlodek Rabinowicz, and Alvaro Sandroni.
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shortcomings is that it has very little to say about where those preferences come from or
how they might change. An agents preferences are assumed to be xed and exogenously
given (a few exceptional, revisionary works are cited below). They are xed in that the
agent never changes his or her fundamentalpreferences over fully specied outcomes;
at most, the agent may change his or her derivedpreferences over actions after learning
new information about their likely outcomes. And preferences are exogenously given in
that the theory cannot explain how they are formed: an agents preferences are simply
taken to be an essential but inexplicable feature of the agents personal identity.
Our aim in this paper is to introduce a formal framework for conceptualizing and
modelling preference formation and preference change, and thereby to contribute to
lling rational choice theorys gap in this respect. As explained in detail below, the
central idea is that an agents preferences are based on certain motivationally salient
properties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Accordingly, an agents
preferences may change as new properties of the alternatives become salient or previously
salient ones cease to be so. Our paper is devoted to exploring the consequences of this
idea. The present work, in turn, is part of a larger project on the role of reasons in
rational choice.1
Of course, there are several earlier works on endogenously determined preferences,2
and what we are proposing should not be seen as a rival to established work in rational
choice theory, but as a friendly amendment, albeit an ambitious one. Crucially, the
papers contribution is conceptual and foundational, not technical, and we keep the
formalism to a minimum. But despite being formally elementary, we hope to provide an
interesting, and at least somewhat provocative, basis for further work.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our main framework for
capturing the relationship between properties and preferences, and dene what it means
for an agents preferences to be property-based. In Section 3, we present an axiomatic
characterization of property-based preferences, which shows that our key concept is not
ad hoc, but justiable in terms of two simple axioms. In Section 4, we discuss what
all this suggests for preference formation and preference change. We also respond to
the objection that our theory has so many degrees of freedom that it runs the risk of
becoming unfalsiable. In Section 5, we distinguish between two concepts of rationality
a thin, formal one and a thicker, substantive one and show that our framework can be
used to formalize both, thereby allowing us to clear up some common misunderstandings
between economists and philosophers. In Section 6, we o¤er an alternative perspective
on our theory, suggesting that our property-based account of preference formation can
also be re-expressed as a double-ontologyaccount, in which the agents ontology of
alternatives is distinguished from that of the modeller. In Section 7, nally, we sketch a
simple game-theoretic application, illustrating how our theory might be used to capture
endogenous preferences in concrete cases.
1For a companion paper addressed to a philosophical audience, with further references to the related
literature, see Dietrich and List (2009). For some related informal ideas, see Pettit (1991).
2For works on how human tastes and other characteristics depend on environmental factors such as
institutions, policies, and interactions with other people, see, for instance, Polak (1976), Bowles (1998),
Rabin (1998) and Dietrich (2008a). For explicit analyses of preference change, also in the context of
dynamic inconsistency, see Strotz (1955-56), Hammond (1976), ODonoghue and Rabin (1999), Bradley
(2007), Dietrich (2008b) and Dietrich and List (forthcoming). Preference evolution is analyzed, e.g.,
by Dekel et al. (2007). For discussions of preference change in group deliberation, see Dryzek and List
(2003) and List, Fishkin, Luskin and McLean (2000/2006).
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2 The main framework
2.1 The objects of preference
We want to model how an agent forms and possibly revises his or her preferences
over some set X of fundamental objects of preference. Depending on the application,
the objects in X can be fully described outcomes or consequences of actions, possible
worlds, social states, bundles of goods, or policy platforms. For simplicity, we call them
alternatives. Our only assumption is that the alternatives in X are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive of the relevant space of possibilities. Although it is sometimes
useful to dene an agents preferences not just over fundamental alternatives, but also
over prospects involving uncertainty (e.g., probability distributions over alternatives),
we here focus on preferences in the purecase without uncertainty.
2.2 The agents preferences
We represent the agents preferences by some order % on X (a complete and transitive
binary relation), where x % y means that the agent weakly prefers x to y. As usual, 
and  denote the strict and indi¤erence parts of %. Unlike in standard rational choice
theory, we do not treat the agents preference order % as given, but are interested in how
it is formed and how it may be revised. To address these questions, we introduce the
idea that the agents preferences over the alternatives in X depend on certain properties
of those alternatives. To explain this idea, we rst dene properties of alternatives in
general; we then dene the agents motivational state as a set of motivationally salient
properties of the alternatives; and nally we specify how the agents preference order
depends on those motivationally salient properties.
2.3 Properties of the alternatives
Informally, a property is a characteristic that an alternative may or may not have. For
example, being fat-free or being vegetarian is a property that a dinner option may or
may not have. Any property thus partitions the setX of alternatives into those that have
the property and those that do not. (There are number of ways in which our approach
can handle non-binary properties, but we set this issue aside for present purposes; see,
e.g., Dietrich and List forthcoming.)
Formally, we can dene a property either extensionally or intensionally. On the
extensional approach, a property is simply dened as the subset of X containing all
the alternatives that have the property. So the property of redness is nothing but the
set of all red objects in X. On the intensional approach, by contrast, a property is
dened in terms of some description or label, such as being red. Thus a property
merely picks out a subset of X but is not identied with it. This can accommodate
the fact that two or more di¤erently described properties can have the same extension.
In a given set of election candidates, for instance, the properties of being at least 50
years oldand having at least 25 years of political experiencemay be satised by the
same people. It is well known at least since Kahneman and Tverskys classic works on
framing e¤ects that the description of something may a¤ect an agents attitude towards
it (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981; see also Gold and List 2004).
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2.4 The agents motivational state
The key idea underlying our approach is that, in forming his or her preferences, an
agent focuses on some, but not necessarily all, properties of the alternatives. We call
the properties that the agent focuses on the motivationally salient ones, and we call the
set of such properties, M , the agents motivational state. Which properties are in M
in any situation is ultimately a psychological question, which a formal theory by itself
cannot settle. For example, after having su¤ered from gallstones, an agent may form his
or her preferences over various kinds of food on the basis of whether they are healthy,
and may not be interested in whether their taste is rich. Or, in forming preferences over
cars, an agent may focus on whether a car is cheap, safe and environmentally friendly,
and may not be interested in whether it is good for racing or whether it will impress
the neighbours. Someone else, on the other hand, may be preoccupied with the latter
properties.
We writeM to denote the set of all motivational states that are deemed psychologi-
cally possible for the agent; formally,M is some non-empty set of sets of properties. By
stating which specications of M are included inM, we can capture di¤erent assump-
tions about which properties can simultaneously become motivationally salient for the
agent. Such assumptions range from certain minimal richness assumptions, according
to which some properties are always motivationally salient, to certain crowding out
or crowding inassumptions, whereby the motivational salience of some properties ei-
ther excludes, or necessitates, the motivational salience of others. For instance, when
an agent gives too much attention to the monetary properties of something, such as
the nancial rewards from taking an action, he or she may lose sight of its charitable
properties, such as the fact that it benets others, as famously suggested by Titmusss
comparative study of voluntary blood donations in the UK and paid blood donations
in the US (Titmuss 1970).
2.5 Property-based preferences
To indicate that the agents preference order % depends on his or her motivational
state M , we append the subscript M to the symbol %, interpreting %M as the agents
preference order in state M . A full model of an agent thus requires the ascription of
an entire family of preference orders %M to the agent, one for each motivational state
M 2M. Below we suggest a dispositional interpretation of this family.
So how exactly does %M depend on M? We call the agents family of preference
orders (%M )M2M property-based if there exists a binary relation  over property com-
binations (consistent sets of properties3) such that, for any motivational state M 2 M
and any alternatives x; y 2 X,
x %M y , fP 2M : x satises Pg  fP 2M : y satises Pg:
We then say that xs having the properties in fP 2M : x satises Pg and ys having the
properties in fP 2M : y satises Pg are the agents motivating reasons (or motives) for
preferring x to y in state M . And we call  the agents weighing relation over property
combinations.
3A set of properties is consistent if there exists an alternative x 2 X which satises all of them.
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Notice that, although the agents preference order %M in any motivational state
M 2 M is complete and transitive, the underlying weighing relation need not be.
However, the following holds:
Remark 1 A binary relation  over property combinations induces a property-based
family of preference orders (%M )M2M if and only if, for any M 2 M, the restriction
of  to the set XM = ffP 2M : x satises Pg : x 2 Xg is complete and transitive.
The right-hand side of this biconditional is consistent with the relation  itself
not being complete or transitive; for an example, see Dietrich and List (2009). We
should note that, although we here focus on preference relations that are complete and
transitive, nothing in our approach rules out the analysis of incomplete or intransitive
preferences. Indeed, if preferences are property-based, then their formal structure will
depend on the structure of the agents weighing relation, and if certain property com-
binations in the same set XM turn out to be mutually incomparable or not transitively
ranked, then this will show up in the agents preferences.
2.6 An example
A simple example helps to illustrate the ideas just introduced. Consider an agent faced
with a choice between four alternatives, namely di¤erent cakes:
S&H: a sweet and healthy cake, :S&H: a non-sweet and healthy cake,
S&:H: a sweet and unhealthy cake, :S&:H: a non-sweet and unhealthy cake.
For simplicity, suppose the only properties that may become motivationally salient for
the agent are:
S: The cake is sweet. H: The cake is healthy.
Suppose further that any set of properties can in principle be motivationally salient, so
that the set of all possible motivational states is
M = ffS,Hg; fSg; fHg;?g.
Now the agents preferences across di¤erent M 2M might be as follows:
In state M = fS,Hg: S&H M nS&H M S&nH M nS&nH.
In state M = fSg: S&H M S&nH M nS&H M nS&nH.
In state M = fHg: S&H M nS&H M S&nH M nS&nH.
In state M = ?: S&H M nS&H M S&nH M nS&nH.
These preferences can be veried to be property-based, with respect to the following
weighing relation:
fS,Hg > fHg > fSg > ?:
In short, a single weighing relation over property combinations su¢ ces to induce the
agents entire family of preference orders across di¤erent motivational states. Needless
to say, di¤erent weighing relations may lead to di¤erent preferences.
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3 An axiomatic characterization
To show that our denition of property-based preferences is not ad hoc, it is useful
to characterize such preferences axiomatically. The rst of the two theorems to be
presented is a variant of an earlier result in a terminologically distinct but formally
equivalent setting (Dietrich and List 2009), while the second is new; proofs are given
in the Appendix. The following two axioms seem to be reasonable constraints on the
relationship between motivationally salient properties and preferences.
Axiom 1 Only motivationally salient properties motivate. For any two alternatives
x; y 2 X and any motivational state M 2M,
if fP 2M : x satises Pg = fP 2M : y satises Pg, then x M y.
This axiom simply says that the agent is indi¤erent between any two alternatives
whose motivationally salient properties are the same.
Axiom 2 Adding motivationally salient properties not satised by either of two alter-
natives does not change the preference between them. For any two alternatives x; y 2 X
and any two motivational states M;M 0 2M with M 0 M ,
if neither x nor y satises any P 2M 0nM; then x %M y , x %M 0 y.
This axiom says that if the agents motivational state is extended, in that additional
properties become motivationally salient, this does not change the agents preference
between any alternatives that satisfy none of the newly added properties. This is weaker
than the requirement that the preference between any two alternatives should never
change so long as the newly added properties do not discriminate between them.
Axiom 3 Adding motivationally salient properties that do not discriminate between
two alternatives does not change the preference between them. For any two alternatives
x; y 2 X and any two motivational states M;M 0 2M with M 0 M ,
if [x satises P , y satises P ] for any P 2M 0nM , then x %M y , x %M 0 y.
While this stronger requirement may be plausible if di¤erent motivationally salient
properties have a separable e¤ect on the agents preferences, it rules out the possibility
that the motivational e¤ect of some properties may depend on which other properties
are also motivationally salient. Since we do not wish to exclude such non-separability
of di¤erent properties a priori, we generally defend only the weaker requirement, not
the stronger one.
What is the consequence of our axioms? It turns out that, if the set of possible
motivational states satises a suitable closure condition, Axioms 1 and 2 characterize
the class of property-based families of preference orders. CallM intersection-closed if,
whenever M1;M2 2M, then M1 \M2 2M.
Theorem 1 Suppose M is intersection-closed. Then the agents family of preference
orders (%M )M2M satises Axioms 1 and 2 if and only if it is property-based.
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Thus the two axioms guarantee that the agents preferences across variations in
his or her motivational state are representable by a single underlying weighing relation
over property combinations. If we replace Axiom 2 by Axiom 3 (and strengthen the
closure condition on M), we obtain the following stronger characterization. Call M
subset-closed if, whenever M1 2M and M2 M1 then M2 2M.
Theorem 2 SupposeM is subset-closed. Then the agents family of preference orders
(%M )M2M satises Axioms 1 and 3 if and only if it is property-based in a separable
way, i.e., the family (%M )M2M is representable by a separable weighing relation.4
Separability of the weighing relation means that the ranking of any property com-
bination S1 relative to any other S2 does not depend on which further properties are
present, ceteris paribus; formally,
S1  S2 if and only if S1 [ T  S2 [ T;
where T is any set of properties not in S1 or in S2 but consistent with each of S1 and
S2. In general, there is no such restriction on the weighing relation.
4 What this suggests for preference formation and prefer-
ence change
4.1 The basic implication
If our theory is correct, the underlying stable feature characterizing an agent is not the
agents preference order over the alternatives in X, as in standard rational choice theory,
but the agents weighing relation over property combinations. This weighing relation
is an abstract entity, which need not be directly cognitively accessible to the agent. It
could be interpreted, for instance, in dispositional terms. If S1  S2, this could be taken
to mean that the agent is disposed to prefer an alternative whose motivationally salient
properties are those in S1 to one whose motivationally salient properties are those in
S2.
While the agents weighing relation is stable on this picture, his or her motiva-
tional state is variable. This suggests the following picture of preference formation and
preference change:
 An agent forms his or her preferences by adopting a particular motivational state,
i.e., by focusing consciously or otherwise on certain properties of the alterna-
tives as the motivationally salient ones (and by taking on a weighing relation in
the rst place).
 An agent may change his or her preferences when the motivational state changes,
i.e., when new properties of the alternatives become motivationally salient or
others cease to be salient.
4The assumption that M is subset-closed cannot be weakened to Theorem 1s assumption of
intersection-closure. A counterexample is given at the end of the Appendix.
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4.2 Is this theory empirically testable?
At rst sight, one might worry that the greater degrees of freedom in our model, com-
pared to standard models of rational choice, imply that it can explainalmost anything,
i.e., that it might be unfalsiable. We now want to show that this is not the case and
that the model can be empirically operationalized.
To do so, we need to introduce one further idea, namely that empirically observable
contexts induce particular motivational states. Let us dene a context as a situation
the agent can observably be in, and let us write C to denote a set of contexts. A context
might be:
 a concrete choice situation, as given by a feasible set of alternatives;
 a particular way in which a decision problem is framed (in Kahneman and Tver-
skys sense of framing);
 a socially well-dened role in which the agent is expected to act in a given situation;
 an observable life circumstance of the agent; and so on.
What matters is that the di¤erent contexts in C are empirically distinguishable. For
a full operationalization of our theory, we need to add to our formal model:
(a) a hypothesis about what the agents set of psychologically possible motivational
statesM is, as already mentioned;
(b) a hypothesis about what the relation between empirically observable contexts and
motivational states is, as captured by some motivation function f : C !M;
(c) a hypothesis about the agents weighing relation .
It should be evident that the conjunction of our model and (a), (b) and (c) straight-
forwardly entails what the agents preferences will be in any given context namely
%f(C) for context C 2 C and consequently what his or her choice behaviour will look
like, assuming the usual relationship between preferences and choices. Hence the result-
ing theory is straightforwardly testable. When presented with recalcitrant evidence, of
course, we will always face a choice between giving up our core model itself and giving
up one or more of the auxiliary assumptionsunder (a), (b) and (c). This predicament,
however, is no di¤erent from the familiar one in other areas of science.
4.3 Minimal constraints on testability
Although a full operationalization of our theory requires a full specication of (a), (b)
and (c), it is worth observing that a suitable constraint under any one of (a), (b) or (c)
alone is already su¢ cient to render the resulting theory empirically non-vacuous. We
give the simplest toyexamples by which it is possible to establish this point.
4.3.1 Constraining the agents motivational states under (a)
Suppose, for instance, we hypothesize that in any psychologically possible motivational
state M 2M there are at most three motivationally salient properties, while we do not
make any hypotheses under (b) and (c). Given our model, the present hypothesis alone
implies that, in any motivational state, the agents preference order will have no more
than 8 (= 23) indi¤erence classes, which, in turn, is a testable implication, assuming,
as before, the usual relationship between preferences and choices.
8
4.3.2 Constraining the agents motivation function under (b)
Suppose we only hypothesize that the agents motivation function is constant, i.e., that
any context triggers the same motivational state, while saying nothing about (a) and
(c). In this case, our model reduces to a variant of a standard model of rational choice,
according to which the agents preference order is context-independently xed. Since
this standard model is testable, the present model will be testable too.
4.3.3 Constraining the agents weighing relation under (c)
Suppose, to give a rather trivial example, we hypothesize that the agents weighing rela-
tion is dichotomous, i.e., distinguishes only between two equivalence classes of property
combinations. Regardless of our assumptions about (a) and (b), this constrains the
agents preference order in any motivational state to have no more than two indi¤er-
ence classes, a testable implication. For a less trivial example, consider the hypothesis
that the agents weighing relation is separable. If we can nd two pairs of alternatives
x; y and x0; y0 such that x0 and y0 are obtained from x and y, respectively, by adding
the same properties, then our model implies that, in any motivational state, the agent
prefers x to y if and only if he or she prefers x0 to y0, a testable implication so long as
the agents motivational state is assumed to be stable across those two comparisons.
5 Two concepts of rationality
5.1 Formal versus substantive rationality
In economics, the concept of rationality is usually interpreted in thin, formal terms.
An agent is said to be rational, roughly, if his or her preferences and/or choices satisfy
certain formal consistency constraints, and his or her beliefs are responsive to informa-
tion in a Bayesian manner. While there are many ways of making the denition formally
precise, practically all denitions of rationality in economics can be viewed as explica-
tions of this basic idea. In ordinary discourse as well as in philosophy, by contrast, we
often employ the concept of rationality in a thicker, more substantive way, to imply
something not only about the formal consistency of an agents attitudes (preferences
and beliefs), but also about their content. For instance, we often describe someone
with self-destructive or otherwise unreasonablepreferences as irrational, even if those
preferences and the resulting behaviour are internally consistent. The standard inter-
pretation of rationality in economics would not licence this use of the term.
5.2 Hume versus Kant
Historically, the distinction between formal and substantive concepts of rationality is
reected nicely in the contrast between David Humes and Immanuel Kants ways of
thinking about the requirements of rationality, which they called reason. Like modern
economic theory, Hume endorses a thin, formal conception of rationality, whereas Kant
defends a much thicker, substantive conception. The following is an illustrative quote
from Humes Treatise of Human Nature:
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It is not contrary to reason [rationality in modern terms] to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my nger. It is not
contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin. . . It is as little contrary
to reason to prefer even my own acknowledgd lesser good to my greater. . .
In short, a passion must be accompanyd with some false judgement [belief
in modern terms], in order to its being unreasonable; and even then it is not
the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.
(Hume 1739, bk. 2, pt. 3, sect. 3)5
Kant, on the other hand, stresses that there are two kinds of rationality require-
ments, which he calls the hypotheticaland categorical imperatives(Kant 1788). A
hypothetical imperativeevaluates merely whether, given the agents ends, the agents
means are e¤ective in achieving those ends. This leaves open the question of whether
the ends themselves are worthyones. In modern terms, the focus is solely on whether
the agents actions and choices are consistent with his or her preferences, not on whether
those preferences are reasonable. This corresponds, once again, to the thin conception
of rationality underlying modern economics. However, Kant proposes a categorical im-
perativeto evaluate the ends themselves. In modern terms, this requirement focuses
not just on the internal consistency of the agents preferences and choices, but also on
their content, and here Kants criterion is famously the universalizability of the agents
ends. But what matters for the purposes of this paper is not Kants own criterion for
evaluating the contents of an agents preferences, but the distinction between formal and
substantive criteria of rationality. The failure to be clear about this distinction tends to
generate frequent misunderstandings between economists and philosophers (as well as
people not trained in either discipline). We suggest that our property-based account of
preference formation provides us with the formal resources to capture this distinction
and to express di¤erent substantive, and not just formal, accounts of rationality.
5.3 Formalizing substantive accounts of rationality
We can obviously express the standard formal constraints of rationality in our model,
and add to them the formal constraints given by our axioms. But we are also able to
formalize two kinds of substantive constraints, each of which can in principle be of a
prudential or of a moral kind:
(a) constraints on the normatively admissible weighing relations over property com-
binations, and
(b) constraints on the normatively relevant properties of the alternatives.
With regard to (a), we can ask whether the agents actual weighing relation over
property combinations meets the given normative constraints, i.e., whether the agent
weighs di¤erent properties in a normatively admissible manner. And with regard to (b),
5For easier readability, Humes expressions "tis" and "chuse" have been replaced by the more modern
forms "it is" and "choose".
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we can compare
(i) the agents motivation function from contexts to sets of motivationally
salient properties, which captures his or her actual motivational dispositions
with (ii) an ideal function from contexts to sets of normatively admissible properties,
which captures the properties the agent ought to focus on in forming his or
her preferences in any context, according to some normative criterion.
This corresponds to the distinction between the agents actual motivating reasons (or
motives) for his or her preferences, and what the right normative reasons would be, given
the relevant normative criterion. Using this distinction, we are then able to explore the
relationship between actual and normatively ideal preferences.
In sum, introducing constraints under (a) and (b) allows us to distinguish, on the
one hand, between preferences based on an admissible weighing relation and preferences
based on an inadmissible one, and on the other hand, between preferences held for the
right reasons and preferences held for the wrong reasons. Being able to draw these
distinctions is an important feature of any substantive account of rationality as well as
morality.
5.4 Some examples of substantive accounts
It is worth sketching some concrete examples of substantive accounts of rationality,
including those that introduce moral motivations. A familiar substantive theory of
rationality is the self-interest theory. According to it, the only normatively relevant
properties of the alternatives are those that directly a¤ect the agent in question. If
the alternatives are allocations of goods, for example, then only properties of the ith
component of any allocation vector are deemed relevant to agent i. The weighing relation
typically encodes some kind of more is betterprinciple. Another substantive theory,
albeit a moral one, is a utilitarian theory. Here the normatively relevant properties
of the alternatives are those that describe the happiness or welfare of any a¤ected
agent. In allocations, these are properties pertaining to all components, not just those
corresponding to agent i. The weighing relation then takes some kind of additive form,
whereby one property combination is ranked above another whenever the sum-total
of the ascribed welfare in the rst combination exceeds that in the second. A third
illustrative theory, again of a moral kind, is a Rawlsian one. Under this theory, the
normatively relevant properties of the alternatives are those that specify the level of
primary goods and other resources held by the least advantaged members of the relevant
society. The weighing relation then ranks one property combination above another
whenever the ascribed level of goods or resources in the rst combination exceeds that in
the second. Interestingly, any positional dictatorship, including maximin and maximax,
can be dened in terms of the same weighing relation, by specifying a di¤erent set of
normatively relevant properties. It should be clear that many other normative theories,
whether of a prudential or of a moral kind, can be expressed in our model.
While decision theory in the tradition of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
Savage (1954) and Je¤rey (1965/1983) o¤ers a purely formal theory of rationality, the
homo economicus thesis, which goes back at least to Adam Smiths Wealth of Nations
(1776) and is still inuential in many branches of economics, entails the conjunction of
a formal theory and a substantive one. Its formal part coincides with standard decision
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theory, but it adds to this a self-interest theory of human motivation (though Smith
himself did not use the term homo economicus and acknowledges other motivations
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759). So, ironically, even many economists,
for instance in the areas of public choice and political economy, endorse a substantive
theory of rationality, contrary to the o¢ cial doctrine of dening rationality in thin,
formal terms alone.
6 An alternative perspective on our theory
We have emphasized the idea that an agents preference order over a given set of al-
ternatives depends on the properties of the alternatives that are motivationally salient
for the agent. The stable characteristic of the agent is no longer his or her preference
order, but the underlying weighing relation over property combinations. No doubt,
many economists will be reluctant to accept this departure from the standard theory,
even if they agree that more needs to be said about how choices depends on contextual
factors. Instead, they may try to explain this context-dependency without giving up the
assumption of stable preferences. Unlike critics who view this assumption as restrictive
and unrealistic, rational choice theorists see it as a virtue of their theory, which underlies
its elegance and parsimony.
This raises the question of whether we could explain the phenomena captured by
our theory in a more classical manner. One strategy would be:
 to introduce a su¢ ciently ne-grained ontologyof alternatives over which the
agent would be assumed to hold xed preferences6 (this would be a renement of
the set X assumed in our model), and
 to reinterpret any preference change over the original, non-rened alternatives as
an instance of an ordinary information-driven preference change over uncertain
prospects, consistent with stable preferences over the rened alternatives.
On this strategy, the fundamental alternatives prior to the renement would correspond
to uncertain prospects in the rened ontology. What initially appeared to be a funda-
mental preference change would then be a change in the agents derived preferences over
non-fundamental prospects, driven by new information about their likely consequences.
But although some preference changes might be explained in this manner, we do not
think this strategy works in general. The reasons are formal and interpretational, and
we here sketch them only briey.
Formally, the dynamics of preference change consistent with this classical picture
would be very di¤erent from the dynamics permitted by our model. First, any prefer-
ence change would have to satisfy the constraints of Bayesian information learning. A
preference reversal between two alternatives would be possible, roughly speaking, only
if the agent came to assign lower subjective probabilities to the favourable consequences
of the one alternative, relative to the favourable consequences of the other, and if that
reassignment of probabilities respected Bayess rule. Among other things, the agent
would have had to assign non-zero probabilities to all relevant rened consequences; he
or she could not have been unaware of some of them. Secondly, if all preference changes
were information-driven, the agent would always be dynamically consistent. We would
6To be precise, we would need to specify those preferences by von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities.
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not be able to account for any dynamic inconsistencies due to changes in preference.
Thirdly, under the informational picture, many preference changes would be irreversible,
as Bayesian information learning would always narrow down the set of alternatives to
which the agent assigns non-zero probability. Unless we are willing to admit a combi-
natorial explosion of the set of fundamental alternatives, the possibility that someone
might repeatedly switch back and forth between di¤erent preferences, depending on the
context, would not be explicable.
Interpretationally, the main cost of remodelling every preference change in informa-
tional terms would be a signicant expansion of the ontology of alternatives over which
the agent would have to hold beliefs and preferences. This is a cognitively demanding
model of an agent, which does not seem to be psychologically plausible. We would
preserve rational choice theorys parsimony with respect to the assumption of xed
preferences only at the expense of sacricing parsimony with respect to the cognitive
complexity ascribed to the agent.
However, there is an alternative strategy by which we could accommodate the con-
tent of our theory while preserving the assumption of stable preferences. The strategy
is to reinterpret the agents weighing relation as a preference relation of a more fun-
damental kind, while introducing a distinction between the agents ontology and that
of the modeller. This distinction captures the idea that di¤erent contexts give rise to
di¤erent lensesthrough which the agent perceives the world. Suppose that, over and
above the objective set of alternatives X as described by the modeller, there exists
a subjectiveset of alternatives X , which are the possible alternatives in the agents
perception. Specically, each context C 2 C gives rise to a perception function,
pC : X ! X ;
which assigns to each objective alternative x 2 X a corresonding subjective alternative
pC(x) 2 X , interpreted as the alternative x as perceived by the agent in context C.
We then assume that the agents preferences over the subjective alternatives are
fundamental and stable, while his or her preferences over the objective alternatives are
derived and context-dependent. We can introduce a binary relation  to represent
the agents stable preferences over X , and a family of binary relations (%C)C2C to
represent the agents context-dependent preferences over X. Specically, the agent
prefers an objective alternative x over another, y, in context C if and only if he or
she fundamentally prefers the subjective alternative pC(x) to the subjective alternative
pC(y). Formally, for any x; y 2 X and any C 2 C,
x %C y , pC(x)  pC(y): (1)
For example, if the agent perceives an objective alternative x solely as benetting
him- or herself while he or she perceives another, y, as less personally benecial, then
this will naturally lead to a preference for x over y. But if the agent perceives x as
adversely a¤ecting other people and y as having fewer negative externalities, then he
or she may well arrive at the reverse preference, consistently with the same underlying
preferences over subjective alternatives. Similarly, if the agents perception function
maps two distinct objective alternatives to the same subjective one, then it is natural
for the agent to be indi¤erent between them. If someone perceives a café latte and
an Australian at white as the same thing, for instance, he or she will naturally be
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indi¤erent between them. But if the agents perception function changes and the two
objective alternatives are mapped to distinct subjective ones, then the same underlying
preference relation may well rank one of them above the other.
It should be evident that our property-based account of preference formation can
be re-expressed in these terms. Here the subjective alternatives in X take the form
of property combinations, and the agents perception function maps each objective
alternative to its set of motivationally salient properties in any given context. Formally,
for x 2 X and any C 2 C,
pC(x) = fP 2M : x satises Pg, where M = f(C). (2)
Substituting (2) into (1), we obtain the now-familiar structure of property-based pref-
erences, i.e., for any x; y 2 X and any C 2 C,
x %C y , fP 2M :x satisesPg  fP 2M :y satisesPg, where M=f(C):
The weighing relation is then reinterpreted as a fundamental preference relation over
subjective alternatives.
Whether the original interpretation of our model or this new, double-ontology
interpretation is more plausible is, to some extent, in the eye of the beholder. On
the rst interpretation, the agents ontology of alternatives is objective and xed, but
preferences depend on the context and specically on the agents motivational state.
The agents stable characteristic is the underlying weighing relation, which, on this
interpretation, is distinct from a preference relation. On the second interpretation, the
agents ontology of alternatives is subjective and variable, but we can reinterpret the
agents weighing relation as a stable preference relation over subjective alternatives.
The di¤erence between the two interpretations lies in the psychological account they
give of the agent, and for this reason psychology may ultimately have to adjudicate
between them.
7 An illustrative game-theoretic application
To illustrate how our model of preference formation can be used in standard game-
theoretic applications, consider a simple two-player game whose form and material pay-
o¤s are those of the prisonersdilemma, as shown in Table 1.7
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2,2 0,3
Defect 3,0 1,1
Table 1: A prisonersdilemma in material payo¤s
Consider the set X of possible outcomes (action pairs) of the game. Many properties
of the elements of X might be of interest, for instance what the payo¤ of a player is,
7For earlier works on other-regarding feelings in games, such as sympathy and reciprocity but also
spitefulness, see, e.g., Rabin (1993), Fehr and Gächter (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Sethi and
Somanathan (2001), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
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whether the resulting payo¤s are Pareto-optimal, whether the distribution is equal or
unequal, and so on. For simplicity, let us focus on properties of the following kind:
i gets m,
where i is a player and m a possible material payo¤ (e.g., amount of money). A self-
interested player will be motivated only by properties of the alternatives that a¤ect him-
or herself. Thus, if player i is self-interested, his or her motivational state will be given
by the set of properties
M = fi gets m: m is a possible payo¤g:
By contrast, an other-regarding player will also be motivated by properties of the alter-
natives that a¤ect other players. If player i is other-regarding, his or her motivational
state will be given by the set of properties
M = fj gets m: m is a possible payo¤, j is a playerg:
Clearly, self-interested and other-regarding players perceive the alternatives in Table
1 di¤erently. For a self-interested player 1, the sets of motivationally salient properties
of the four possible outcomes are simply f1 gets 2g, f1 gets 3g, f1 gets 0g, and f1
gets 1g, while for an other-regarding player 1, they are f1 gets 2, 2 gets 2g, f1 gets
3, 2 gets 0g, f1 gets 0, 2 gets 3g, and f1 gets 1, 2 gets 1g. The case for player 2
is analogous.
To keep the example simple, suppose that any players weighing relation  ranks
di¤erent property combinations in terms of the sum-total of the payo¤s listed in them,
formally, for any S1; S2,
S1  S2 ,W (S1) W (S2);
where the weight of any property combination S is
W (S) =
X
m;j : j gets m2S
m:
For example, the weight of the property combination f1 gets 2g is 2, while that of the
property combination f1 gets 2, 2 gets 2g is 4, and so on.
Given this weighing relation, the playerspreferences over the four possible outcomes
are now straightforwardly induced by their motivational state (self-interested or other-
regarding), as shown in Figure 1. Thus the material game form introduced above
induces four di¤erent games in preference terms, with four di¤erent Nash equilibria, as
underlined in each matrix. The resulting behavioural prediction depends crucially on the
playersmotivational states, and thereby on our hypothesis about which contexts trigger
which states. Notably, for other-regarding players, the prisonersdilemma in material
terms is not a prisoners dilemma in preference terms: to the contrary, cooperation
becomes a dominant strategy for any such player.
As this simple example shows, our model can systematically describe the mechanism
by which a material game form is transformed into a fully specied game, depending
on which properties of the outcomes are rendered motivationally salient for the players.
This, in turn, provides us with a basis for studying endogenous preferences in games
more generally.
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2,2 0,3
Defect 3,0 1,1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2,4 0,3
Defect 3,3 1,2
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4,2 3,3
Defect 3,0 2,1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4,4 3,3
Defect 3,3 2,2
Player 1: Self-interested
Player 2: Self-interested
Player 1: Self-interested
Player 2: Other-regarding
Player 1: Other-regarding
Player 2: Self-interested
Player 1: Other-regarding
Player 2: Other-regarding
Underlined: the equilibrium strategy profile
Figure 1: The playerspreferences in di¤erent motivational states
8 Concluding remarks
Our aim has been to connect two distinct ways of thinking about an agents preferences:
 Economists tend to follow the classical instrumental model of rational agency that
goes back to David Hume. The models strength is its parsimony, but its weakness
is its inability to account for preference formation or genuine preference change.
 Philosophers and others tend to be interested in a more substantive model of ra-
tional agency, under which we can account for the motivations behind an agents
preferences and for genuine preference change, and under which we can norma-
tively assess the content of those preferences.
By supplementing standard rational choice theory with a property-based account of
preference formation, our proposal seeks to build a bridge between these two ways of
thinking.
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A Appendix: proofs
Notation. Let us write P to denote the set of all relevant properties (e.g., we could
stipulate P := S
M2M
M). Each property (e.g., P;Q; ::: 2 P) denes a set of alternatives
with that property, called the extension of the property and denoted by putting the
property symbol in bold (e.g., P;Q:::  X). The set of properties of x (2 X) that
belong to M ( P) is denoted by Mx = fP 2 M : x satises Pg = fP 2 M : x 2 Pg.
The set of all property combinations (consistent sets of properties) is denoted by S =
fS  P : \P2SP 6= ?g.
We begin with a lemma, which is useful to prove both theorems.
Lemma 1 Suppose Axiom 1 holds. For all x; y; x0; y0 2 X and allM 2M, ifMx =Mx0
and My =My0 then x %M y , x0 %M y0.
Proof. For x; y; x0; y0 2 X andM 2M, ifMx =Mx0 andMy =My0 , then, under Axiom
1, x M x0 and y M y0, whence by transitivity x %M y , x0 %M y0. 
The following proof of Theorem 1 is closely analogous to that of the rst theorem
in Dietrich and List (2009), but applies more generally since the present paper explic-
itly treats properties intensionally rather than extensionally, distinguishing between a
property P 2 P and its extension P  X.
Proof of Theorem 1. First consider the easy direction of implication. If a binary
relation  on S represents the family of preference orders (%M )M2M, then Axiom 2
holds obviously. To see that Axiom 1 holds, consider M 2 M and x; y 2 X such that
Mx = My. As %M is reexive, x M x, whence Mx  Mx since  induces %M . Since
Mx Mx and Mx =My, it follows that Mx My. So, x M y, again since  induces
%M .
Now consider the non-trivial direction. Suppose Axioms 1 and 2 hold, and suppose
M is intersection-closed (an assumption not needed above for the easy direction).
Claim 1. For all x; y; x0; y0 2 X and all M;M 0 2M, if Mx =M 0x0 and My =M 0y0 , then
x %M y , x0 %M 0 y0.
Consider any x; y; x0; y0 2 X and M;M 0 2 M such that Mx = M 0x0 and My = M 0y0 .
AsM is intersection-closed, M \M 0 2M. Now
(M \M 0)x = (M \M 0)x0 =Mx =M 0x0 ,
18
because, rstly, Mx =M 0x0 ; secondly, (M \M 0)x =Mx, as (M \M 0)x =Mx\M 0x =Mx
(the last identity holds because M 0x  (M 0x0)x = (Mx)x = Mx); and, thirdly, (M \
M 0)x0 = M 0x0 , as (M \ M 0)x0 = Mx0 \ M 0x0 = M 0x0 (the last identity holds because
Mx0  (Mx)x0 = (M 0x0)x0 =M 0x0). Analogously,
(M \M 0)y = (M \M 0)y0 =My =M 0y0 .
Since (M \M 0)x =Mx and (M \M 0)y =My, Axiom 2 implies
x %M\M 0 y , x %M y: (3)
Further, since (M \M 0)x0 =M 0x0 and (M \M 0)y0 =M 0y0 , Axiom 2 implies
x0 %M\M 0 y0 , x0 %M 0 y0: (4)
Finally, since (M \M 0)x = (M \M 0)x0 and (M \M 0)y = (M \M 0)y0 , Lemma 1 implies
x %M\M 0 y , x0 %M\M 0 y0: (5)
Combining the equivalences (3), (4) and (5), x %M y , x0 %M 0 y0. 
Claim 1 allows us naturally to dene a binary relation  on S: for all S; S0 2 S,
S  S0 if and only if x %M y for some (hence, by Claim 1, all) x; y 2 X and M 2 M
such that Mx = S and My = S0.
Claim 2. For every M 2M,  induces %M , i.e., x %M y ,Mx My for all x; y 2 X.
Consider any M 2 M and x; y 2 X. Suppose rst that x %M y. To show that
Mx  My, we need to nd x0; y0 2 X and M 0 2 M such that M 0x0 = Mx, M 0y0 = My
and x0 %M 0 y0. Simply take x0 = x, y0 = y, and M 0 = M . Conversely, assume that
Mx  My. By the denition of  and Claim 1, we have x0 %M 0 y0 for all x0; y0 2 X
and M 0 2 M such that M 0x0 = Mx and M 0y0 = My. So, in particular x %M y, which
completes the proof. 
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 2, drawing on Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, if a separable weighing relation  represents the family
of preference orders (%M )M2M, then Axiom 3 holds obviously, and Axiom 1 holds for
the same reason as the one given in the proof of Theorem 1.
Now assume that Axioms 1 and 3 hold, andM is subset-closed. Since Axiom 3 im-
plies Axiom 2 and subset-closure implies intersection-closure, we know from Theorem 1
that there is a weighing relation  which represents the family (%M )M2M. This relation
is not generally separable8 and can therefore not ultimately be used to establish that
preferences are property-based in a separable way. Nonetheless, we start by considering
. Call property combinations S; S0 2 S ranked by  if S  S0 or S0  S. We can
assume without loss of generality that  ranks only pairs of sets S; S0 2 S which feature
8E.g., Axioms 1 and 2 do not generally rule out the existence of a property combination S 2 S such
that S 6 S. If  were separable, it would follow that ? 6 ?. But for all x 2 X, we have x %M x where
M = ?, and hence Mx Mx, i.e., ?  ? (note that ? 2M asM is subset-closed).
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in the representation of preferences, i.e., which are of the form S = Mx and S0 = Mx0
for some M 2M and x; x0 2 X.
Claim 1. If two sets S; S0 2 S are ranked by , then S  S0 , SnC  S0nC for all
C  S \ S0. (So,  is separable in a restricted sense.)
Consider any sets S; S0 2 S ranked by  and any subset C  S \ S0. As S and S0
are ranked by , there are M 2 M and x; x0 2 X such that S = Mx and S0 = Mx0 .
As M contains M and is subset-closed, M also contains the set M := MnC. Since
MnM = C  S \ S0 =Mx \Mx0 , all properties in MnM are satised by both x and
x0. So, by Axiom 3, x %M x0 , x %M x0. Hence, Mx  Mx0 , Mx  Mx0 , as 
represents the preferences. In other words, S  S0 , SnC  S0nC. 
We now dene another weighing relation from , to be denoted , which represents
the agents preferences (Claim 2) and is separable (Claim 3). For all S; S0 2 S, we dene
S  S0 if and only if SnC  S0nC for C = S \ S0; hence, if and only if SnS0  S0nS.
Claim 2.  agrees with  on all pairs ranked by  (i.e., S  S0 , S  S0 for all
S; S0 2 S ranked by ), whence  still induces each preference order %M , M 2M.
Suppose S; S0 2 S are ranked by . By denition, S  S0 if and only if SnC  S0nC
where C = S \ S0. By Claim 1, the latter holds if and only if S  S0. 
Claim 3.  is separable (which completes the proof).
We consider any S; S0 2 S and any C  S \ S0, and show that S  S0 ,
SnC  S0nC (implying that  is separable). By denition of , the expression
on the left-hand side of this equivalence means that SnS0  S0nS, while the expression
on the right-hand side means that (SnC)n(S0nC)  (S0nC)n(SnC). So, noting that
(SnC)n(S0nC) = SnS0 and (S0nC)n(SnC) = S0nS, the two expressions mean the same,
hence are equivalent. 
We nally give an example showing that Theorem 2 would not hold ifM were merely
assumed to be intersection-closed (as in Theorem 1) and not subset-closed. Suppose
M contains just one set M (6= ?), so that M is trivially intersection-closed but not
subset-closed. Consider a weighing relation  which is a non-separable weak order over
property combinations. Assume %M is the preference order generated by , so that
x %M y , Mx  My for all x; y 2 X. Axioms 1 holds as  is reexive, and Axiom 3
holds trivially. Yet the weighing relation  is non-separable, and under mild additional
conditions any other weighing relation is also non-separable. As an extreme case in
which every weighing relation is non-separable, suppose M = P, and the properties are
mutually independent, i.e., for every property set S  P there is an alternative of which
each property in S but none in PnS is true. Then the weighing relation is uniquely
determined by %M , so that every weighing relation there is only one, namely  is
non-separable.
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